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Abstract 
This study investigates the capital structure and investment activities of listed companies on 
the Hanoi Securities Exchange and the Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange in Vietnam. Estimation 
analysis using panel data covering the four-year period 2006-2009 revealed the following results. 
(1) Standard corporate financing theories such as trade-off theory and agency cost theory could 
be appropriate for explaining the capital structure of listed companies in Vietnam. (2) Compared 
to the fundraising activities of the companies analyzed by Nguyen (2006) and Biger et al. (2008), 
the fundraising activities of the listed companies were better explained by standard agency cost 
theory. (3) There are differences between the determinants of long-term fundraising and short-
term fundraising of listed companies in Vietnam. (4) The fundraising determinants of state-
controlled companies are different from those of other companies; state-controlled companies 
have an advantage in tapping external debt funds, and their incentive to reduce their tax 
payments by debt financing is weaker. (5) The companies listed on the Ho Chi Minh Securities 
Exchange depended less on debt financing than those listed on the Hanoi Securities Exchange. 
(6) Listed companies in Vietnam face weak incentives to reduce their tax payments by debt 
financing because the effective corporate tax rate is low. These results imply that the economic 
reforms (“Doi Moi”) implemented by the Vietnamese government, which aims to create an 
economic system based on market mechanisms, have achieved some of their goals in terms of 
fund mobilization and corporate financing. However, our estimation study illustrates several 
limitations of economic reforms, such as the opaque relationship between state-controlled 
companies and government banks, financial restrictions on investment activities, and inactive 
investment of companies that are state-controlled or listed on the Ho Chi Minh Securities 
Exchange. 
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1. Introduction 
After implementing the “Doi Moi” (economic reforms) policy, Vietnam applied market 
principles, and the structure of its economy has changed greatly. In order to multiply forms of 
property, apply market principles, and open the economy, the legal system has rapidly produced 
many new laws such as the Private Company Law (1990), the State-owned Company 
Privatization Law (1990), the Company Law (2000), the Foreign Investment Law (2001), the 
Interest Rate Liberalization Law (2002), the Competition Law (2005), and others. 
Along with the “Doi Moi,” equitization of state-owned companies has been implemented.
1 
With the exception of special industries that need to remain government-controlled, the 
privatization of state-owned companies has been carried out beginning with comparatively 
small-scale companies that have good chances of achieving business efficiency, and the number 
of industries that need to remain government-control has gradually decreased. In addition, many 
private companies have been equitized, and many joint stock companies have been newly 
established. By the end of 2008, about 3,000 of the 5,000 state-owned companies had been 
equitized, and there are about 30,000 joint stock companies that do not have state-owned 
capital.
2 
Listing on a stock exchange is the final stage of the equitization process in Vietnam. In 1998, 
it was decided to establish securities exchanges in Hanoi City and Ho Chi Minh City as stock 
markets that would enable joint stock companies to raise mid- and long-term funds. The Ho Chi 
Minh Securities Exchange (HOSE) and the Hanoi Securities Exchange (HASE) were established 
in 2000 and 2005, respectively. The listing conditions of the HOSE are stricter than those of the 
HASE. In order to be listed on the HOSE, companies need to meet a higher minimum capital 
requirement, show better business performance, and have a more differentiated stock holding 
structure (Table 1-1). The number of listed companies, the amount of buying and selling, the 
trading value, and the aggregate market value of the HOSE and the HASE have increased in 
recent years (Table 1-2). 
3 
(Table 1-1) Listing conditions for the Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchanges 
1 This is described in Table A-1 in the Appendixes.
 
2 These facts were obtained from the statistical data of the General Statistics Office (http://www.gso.gov.vn/)
 
3 As is shown in Table A-3 in the Appendixes, upon the establishment of stock markets, preferential corporate
 




   
 
   
       
   
       
 
       
     
 
       
       
     
   
       
     
 
   
       
   
     
    
     
     
           
             
           
   
     
     
       
   
 (Table 1-2) The Major Indices of Stock Exchange Markets in Vietnam 
In the period of transition, understanding whether companies that played a major role in 
domestic investment could raise funds effectively is crucial for privatizing the Vietnamese 
economy. However, there are very few analyses of the fundraising activity of Vietnamese 
companies that show the characteristics and challenges of this activity. 
Nguyen (2006), who studied empirically the fundraising structure of small and medium-sized 
Vietnamese companies, conducted the first study in this field in Vietnam. In addition, Biger et al. 
(2008) studied the financial structure of Vietnamese companies by using data from the company 
census conducted by the Vietnamese Statistics Bureau in 2002 and 2003. While these studies 
clarified the financial structure of Vietnamese companies, they had several limitations. First, 
since they focused on the financial activities of small and medium-sized companies that faced an 
underdeveloped institutional infrastructure and that were in a two-year company census, the 
financial activity of listed companies in Vietnam remains uninvestigated. Second, because of the 
lack of available data, these studies used problematic methods in their estimation analyses. 
Our study attempts to answer the following two questions by using current standard corporate 
financing theories. (1) What are the characteristics of the fundraising structure of listed 
companies in a transitional economy such as Vietnam, in comparison with the fundraising 
structure of listed companies in developed economies and in other transitional economies? (2) 
What factors can explain the differences, if any, between listed companies in Vietnam and listed 
companies in developed economies and in other transitional economies? In addition, this study 
suggests policies for increasing the effectiveness of Vietnamese corporate finance. 
Through an empirical investigation, we found several interesting results about the fundraising 
behaviors of listed companies in Vietnam. (1) Standard corporate financing theories such as 
trade-off theory and agency cost theory could be appropriate for explaining the capital structure 
of listed companies in Vietnam. (2) The capital structure of listed companies in Vietnam is better 
explained by the standard corporate financing theory based on the agency cost approach in 
comparison with Nguyen (2006) and Biger et al. (2008): Debt ratios have a significantly positive 
relation with firms’ scale and tangibility, and they have a significantly negative relation with 
firms’ growth opportunities. (3) There are differences between the determinants of long-term 
fundraising and of short-term fundraising for listed companies in Vietnam: a firm’s scale and its 
ability to provide collateral are important determinants of long-term fundraising but are not 
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important for short-term fundraising. (4) The fundraising determinants for state-controlled 
companies are different from those for other companies: state-controlled companies have an 
advantage in reducing agency costs that are accompanied by tapping external debt funds. (5) 
There is a tendency for the companies listed on the Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange to depend 
less on debt financing than those listed on the Hanoi Securities Exchange. (6) Listed companies 
in Vietnam have weak incentives to reduce their tax payments through debt financing because 
the effective corporate tax rate is low. These observations suggest that Vietnam’s economic 
reform (“Doi Moi”), whose goal was market economization, has already achieved some 
successes in the corporate financing systems for listed companies. However, in order to end the 
opaque collusion between government-controlled companies and banks and to protect outside 
creditors, further liberalization of the banking sector and disclosure of corporate information are 
urgently needed. 
This study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the analytical framework used to explain 
the capital structure of listed companies in Vietnam. Sections 3 and 4 present an empirical 
examination of the capital structure of listed companies in Vietnam and discuss the empirical 
estimation results. Section 5 summarizes the study’s findings and suggests policy implications. 
2. Analytical Framework for Investigating the Fundraising Behaviors of Listed Companies 
in Vietnam 
According to Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) theory (hereafter referred to as the “MM 
theory”), corporate value does not depend on capital structure; thus, corporate financing has no 
impact on corporate value when the following conditions exist together: a complete capital 
market, perfect information, no corporate taxes, no transaction costs, and no economic 
externalities.  
However, the full set of preconditions of the MM theory is not likely to exist in the real world; 
therefore, an adjusted MM theory (also called the trade-off theory) is required. According to the 
trade-off approach, companies choose the optimal capital structure, which is the structure that 
minimizes the cost of capital so as to maximize the value of the company, while considering the 
risk of bankruptcy and the impact of the corporate tax. The higher a company’s debt ratio, the 
lower its average capital cost. However, when the debt ratio is high, the risk of bankruptcy is also 
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high, so the risk premium is higher as well. The optimal debt ratio is the one associated with 
maximum corporate value.
4 
In addition to corporate taxes and business risk, when there is an information asymmetry, 
agency costs have an important influence on the determination of corporate value, namely the 
choice of the most suitable capital structure for the company. Since the studies of Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), Myers (1977), and Myers and Majluf (1984), the problem of conflicting 
interests among stockholders, managers, and creditors, which are factors in agency costs, has 
attracted a great deal of attention. Companies are able to reduce the agency cost of debt financing 
due to the information asymmetry between the managers of a company and outside creditors by 
providing collateral. Companies with low growth opportunities tend to secure more financing 
through debt to reduce the agency costs that arise due to the information asymmetry between 
stockholders and managers (because stockholders seek the maximization of company value 
while managers pursue their own personal profit). 
Regarding the problem of fundraising structure, there are many studies on both developed 
countries and developing countries; for example, Rajan and Zingales (1995), Varouj et al. (2005), 
and Lee (2000) investigated the fundraising structure of companies in G7 countries, in Canada, 
and in Korea, respectively. Booth (2001), Mieno (2002), and Suto (2001) investigated the 
fundraising structure of companies in ten developing countries, in Thailand, and in Malaysia, 
respectively. There are also many studies on the fundraising structure of companies in 
transitional economies such as those of Eastern European countries and China. For example, 
Delcoure (2007) analyzed the fundraising structure of listed companies in the Czech Republic, 
Poland, Russia, and Slovakia; Bauer (2004), Hussain and Nivorozhkin (1997), and Colombo 
(2001) analyzed the fundraising structure of listed companies in the Czech Republic, in Poland, 
and in Hungary, respectively. Jean (2004) and Guihai and Frank (2006) considered the 
fundraising structure of listed companies in China. However, there have been few formal 
econometric investigations of corporate finance in Vietnam. Nguyen (2006) used data from 1998 
to 2001 for 558 small and medium-sized companies in Vietnam with fewer than 300 employees 
and less than 10,000,000,000 VND in capital. Biger et al. (2008) used a sample of 3,778 
companies with more than ten employees, chosen from enterprises in the 2002-2003 census 
conducted by the Vietnamese Statistics Bureau. These studies used the adjusted MM theory, the 
4 See Myers and Majluf (1984) for details. 
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agency cost approach, and the pecking order approach to investigate the characteristics of the 
fund mobilization of companies in Vietnam. According to these studies, the fundraising activities 
of companies in Vietnam do not accord with many aspects of corporate finance theory; for 
example, the debt ratios are positively correlated with growth opportunities and negatively 
correlated with the fixed assets rate. These discrepancies may be due to the underdeveloped 
institutional environment that the companies in their samples face.
5 
Regarding the agency cost problem in transition economies, the influence of government on 
corporate behaviors is an interesting research topic that has been discussed in previous studies. 
Under an unlisted world analyzed by Nguyen (2006), state-owned small and medium-sized 
companies are found to access bank loans more easily than companies that are not state-owned. 
In fact, there are many listed companies of which the government became the controlling 
stockholder and whose activities were influenced by the government after state-owned 
companies were equitized. These companies are defined as state-controlled companies. Even 
among listed companies on the Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange and the Hanoi Securities 
Exchange, where listing is the last process of company reform, more than 30% are state-
controlled.
6  Regarding the characteristics of the fund mobilization of state-controlled listed 
companies in Vietnam, we present the following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1 
First, it is thought that state-controlled companies have closer relations with state-owned 
banks than other companies. After the “Doi Moi” began, the functions of the state bank and of 
commercial banks were separated, and the interest rate was gradually liberalized.
7 However, 
Vietnam’s four major state-owned banks provide 70% of the financing of the entire economy, 
and more than half of that amount is provided to state-owned companies (World Bank, 2006). 
Due to these relations, in terms of raising funds, state-controlled companies are able to secure 
funds under advantageous conditions. Therefore, it is expected that the debt ratio of state-
controlled companies will be higher than that of companies that are not state-controlled. 
5 Regarding the method of estimation, Nguyen (2006) used four-year average values of both explanatory 
variables and explained variables. Biger et al. (2008) used simultaneous explanatory variables and explained 
variables. The use of these methods may result in the loss of endogenicity of the explanatory variables.
6 According to the latest State-owned Company Law, which was enacted on November 26, 2003, in addition to 
companies in which the government invests 100%, those stock-issuing companies in which the government 
invests more than 50% are classified as state-owned (state-controlled) companies. Among the 286 companies 
listed on the HOSE or the HASE by the end of 2008, the number of state-controlled companies was 96. 
7 See Appendix A-2 for details. 
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Hypothesis 2 
Second, it is thought that state-controlled companies’ incentive to increase debt to reduce their 
corporate tax payments is different from the incentive of companies that are not state-controlled. 
From the viewpoint of the government, which is a 50% stockholder in state-controlled 
companies, corporate tax payments are income for the government itself; thus, it has less 
incentive to use debt to reduce corporate tax payments than other stockholders. Therefore, the 
debt ratio of state-controlled companies may be lower than the debt ratio of companies that are 
not state-controlled. 
3. Estimation Model for Fundraising Behaviors of Listed Companies in Vietnam 
3.1 Estimation Function 
Like Rajan and Zingales (1995), this paper estimates debt ratios, which are the most basic 
index demonstrating the capital structure of companies. Yit is an explained variable; Xjit 
represents the explanatory variables (j  = 1, 2,…, k);  STATE is the state-controlled company 
dummy; α is the fixed effect; βj, γj are coefficients (j = 1, 2,…, k); ε is the matrix of error items; 
and i and t denote the individual company and time, respectively. In order to investigate the 
differences in fundraising structure between the Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange (HOSE) and 
the Hanoi Securities Exchange (HASE) caused by the differences in listing conditions between 
the two exchanges, we estimate separately the samples of these two exchanges by using the same 
estimation function. 
Yit = αi + Σβj Xjit-1 + Σγj STATE*Xjit-1 + ε j
 (1) Explained Variables Yit 
We use four debt ratios as explained variables: Total Debt Ratio (DR), Long-term Debt Ratio 
(LDR), Long-term Bank Loan Ratio (LBR), and Short-term Debt Ratio (SDR). Total Debt Ratio 
(DR) expresses the proportion that fundraising by debt holds in the entire funding of a company, 
and it is the most basic index of fundraising structure. Because of the effects of saving tax 
payments and bankruptcy risk on finance structure relates to the whole debt; using the debt ratio 
is considered to be appropriate for observing the influences of these factors on fundraising 
6 
 
   
 
         
   
   
 
         
       
   
   




         
         
 
       
   
       
     
       
         
   
     
     
                                                 
   
 
         
structure. We calculated the Total Debt Ratio (DR) by dividing the amount of total debt by the 
amount of total assets. 
Short-term debts such as accounts payable or bills used to balance short-term funds and long-
term debts used for long-term investments like equipment, have different characteristics. 
Accounts payable and bills relate to clients, so the information asymmetry of fundraising by 
accounts payable and bills is comparatively small. In contrast, the information asymmetry 
between firms and creditors of long-term debt is larger. Thus, the influence of the agency cost of 
long-term debt on capital structure is stronger than the influence of the agency cost of short-term 
debt. We calculated the Long-term Debt Ratio (LDR) by dividing the total amount of long-term 
debt (for which the maturity period exceeds one year) by the total amount of assets. The Short-
term Debt Ratio (SDR) was calculated by dividing the total amount of short-term debt (for which 
the maturity period is less than one year) by the total amount of assets. 
(2) Explanatory Variables Xjit 
We used the corporate tax rate (TAX) and business scale (SIZE) based on the adjusted MM 
theory (trade-off theory). The effective tax rate (TAX) is calculated by the ratio of the amount of 
corporation tax payment to the amount of operating income.
8 Because there is no term for 
operating income (the total amount of profit before interest payments and tax payments) in the 
financial reports of Vietnamese companies, we calculated operating income by adding interest 
payments and profits before taxes. Business scale (SIZE), which is used as a proxy variable for a 
company’s bankruptcy risk, is calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets.
9 TAX has a 
positive predicted sign because when its corporate tax is higher, a company should raise funds 
through debts such as bank borrowing or bonds, rather than equities in order to reduce its 
corporation tax payment and to allow it to raise its value by that amount. SIZE also has a positive 
sign because the larger the company, the smaller its reductions from exogenous shocks, so its 
bankruptcy risk is lower; thus, payment of the risk premium for mobilizing funds by debt is also 
lower, and its debt ratio tends to be higher. 
We used the fixed assets ratio (TANG) and Tobin’s Q (Q) based on the agency cost approach. 
The fixed assets ratio (TANG), which is used as a proxy variable for the ability to provide 










     
       
     
 
       
     
     
         
     
           
 
         
     
     
   
       




     
   
       
         
     
     
 
                                                 
   
         
 
 
collateral, is defined as the ratio of the total amount of fixed assets to the total amount of assets.
10 
We used Tobin’s Q (the ratio of the total amount of debts and the present value of stocks to the 
book value of total assets) as a proxy variable for the business growth opportunities of a 
company (Q). TANG has a positive predicted sign because the more collateral a company can 
offer, the lower the agency cost of debt financing due to the information asymmetry between the 
managers of the company and the outside creditors, and the higher the debt ratio of the company 
can rise. Q is predicted to have a negative sign because low-growth companies tend to increase 
financing through debt to prevent managers from plundering company profits; this is the issue of 
agency costs between stockholders (clients) and managers (agents) that arises because 
stockholders expect the maximization of company value while managers pursue their own 
personal profit. 
We also used the state-controlled company dummy (STATE) and industry dummies expressing 
characteristics of listed companies in Vietnam as explanatory variables.
11 The state-controlled 
company dummy (STATE) takes a value of 1 for the companies whose government stock holding 
is more than 50% and 0 for the others. In order to control for the influences of macroeconomic 
circumstances, we used a year dummy variable (YD2008, YD2009) that takes a value of 1 for the 
years 2008 and 2009 and 0 for the other years. 
3.2 The Data Set 
The samples we used in the analysis are the non-financial companies listed on the HOSE or 
the HASE before 2008 for which we could obtain the necessary data for at least two consecutive 
years of the period from 2006 to 2009. Financial institutions were excluded from the sample 
because the determinants of their capital structure are different from the determinants of the 
capital structure of non-financial institutions. Data from 2005 and before were excluded from the 
sample because they were too small in comparison with the data from 2006 onward, and thus 
their inclusion biased the estimation results. The necessary data were obtained from the annual 
financial reports of listed companies that were disclosed by the HOSE and the HASE. 
10 Similar to Rajan and Zingales (1995). The amount of fixed assets here includes both the amounts of tangible 

and intangible fixed assets.  

11 The industry dummy variables include construction industry (CONS), manufacturing industry (MANU),
 
mining industry (MIN), electricity industry (POWE), services (SERV), communications (COMM), real estate
 




       
 




       
     
     
         
 
           
   
     
 
   
           
           
         
 
       
         
        
 
 
     
     
 
         
             
 
   
There were 172 companies listed on the HOSE and 168 companies listed on the HASE before 
2008. From these, 154 non-financial companies listed on the HOSE and 145 non-financial 
companies listed on the HASE were included in the sample. The total sample was composed of 
299 non-financial companies.  
3.3 Estimation Method 
Nguyen (2006) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) used four-year average values of both 
explained variables and explanatory variables for their estimations. Booth et al. (2001), Lee 
(2000), and Suto (2001) used simultaneous explained variables and explanatory variables for 
their estimations. In this study, we employ a one-period lag for the explanatory variables in 
relation to the explained variables. 
Commonly used estimation methods for panel data are the Ordinary Least Squares method 
(OLS), the random effect model, and the fixed effect model. However, this study examines 299 
companies for four-year periods (after taking the one-year lag, the periods are three years each). 
Because the time series are too short in comparison with the cross sections, estimation results of 
the fixed effect model are too dependent on the fixed effect; thus, use of this method would be 
improper. For this reason, we did not use the fixed effect method. In order to find out whether 
use of the OLS method or the random effect method would be more proper, we performed a 
Lagrange Multiplier Test (LM test) in which OLS was the null hypothesis. 
3.4 Basic statistics 
Table 3-1 shows the characteristics of the main variables used in the analysis of the sample of 
299 companies. Table 3-2 displays the characteristics of four groups of the companies divided by 
stock market and state control of the company. 
(Table 3-1) Basic Statistics of the Main Variables 

(Table 3-2) Comparison of State-controlled and Non-state-controlled Companies 

(Table 3-3) Correlation Coefficients of the Explanatory Variables
 
As is shown in Table 3-1, the average debt ratio of listed companies in Vietnam is 50.4%, 
which is approximately the same as that of listed companies in China (50%) as reported by 
Guihai and Frank (2006). However, the standard variance of the debt ratio of the listed 




                 
     
     
   
       
     
           
       
       
           
         
             
     
     
             
       
       
 
     
   
       
       
       
     
     
     
   
       
     
companies listed on the HASE is about 58%, which is higher than that of the companies listed on 
the HOSE (44%). There is almost no different between state-controlled companies and 
companies that are not state-controlled on the HASE or the HOSE. 
The average long-term debt ratio of listed companies in Vietnam is 11%, which is higher than 
that of listed companies in China (7%) as reported by Jean (2004). The standard variance of the 
long-term debt ratio of listed companies in Vietnam is high (15.1%). The average long-term debt 
ratio of companies listed on the HASE is 12.4%, which is higher than that of companies listed on 
the HOSE (9.8%). Both on the HASE and on the HOSE, state-controlled companies have higher 
long-term debt ratios than companies that are not state-controlled. State-controlled companies 
listed on the HOSE have the highest average long-term debt ratio (14.4%), while companies 
listed on the HOSE that are not state-controlled have the lowest average long-term debt ratio 
(8.4%).  
The average long-term bank loan ratio of listed companies in Vietnam is 6.8%, which means 
that about 62% of the long-term debt of listed companies in Vietnam is made up of loans from 
banks. The standard variance of the long-term bank loan ratio of listed companies in Vietnam is 
12%. Companies listed on the HASE have a higher average long-term bank loan ratio (7.5%) 
than that of companies listed on the HOSE (6.2%). State-controlled companies have a higher 
average long-term bank loan ratio than companies that are not state-controlled on both the HASE 
and the HOSE, but the gap is larger on the HOSE. The average long-term bank loan ratio of 
state-controlled companies listed on the HOSE is 10.7%, while that of companies listed on the 
HOSE that are not state-controlled is only 4.8%. 
The average short-term debt ratio of listed companies in Vietnam is 39.3%, and the standard 
variance is 20.7%. The average short-term debt ratio of companies listed on the HASE is 45.2%, 
which is higher than that of companies listed on the HOSE (34.2%). There are differences 
between the short-term debt ratios of state-controlled companies and companies that are not 
state-controlled on the HASE and the HOSE. On the HASE, the average short-term debt ratio of 
state-controlled companies is lower than that of companies that are not state-controlled, but on 
the HOSE the reverse is true: state-controlled companies have a higher average short-term debt 
ratio than companies that are not state-controlled. State-controlled companies listed on the HASE 
have the highest average short-term debt ratio (47.1%), and state-controlled companies listed on 




         
         
   
     
       
   
   
 
    
       
     
     
       
               
           
     
   
 
         
             
     
 
         
  
         
     
 
The average Effective Tax Rate of listed companies in Vietnam is 10.5%, which is much 
lower than the official corporate tax rate according to the Corporate Tax Law (28%); this means 
that most listed companies in Vietnam enjoy tax preferences. The standard variance of the 
Effective Tax Rate of listed companies in Vietnam is 7.7%. The Effective Tax Rate of 
companies listed on the HOSE is 10.9%, higher than that of companies listed on the HASE 
(10.1%). Both on the HASE and on the HOSE, state-controlled companies have a lower 
Effective Tax Rate than companies that are not state-controlled, but the difference is stronger on 
the HOSE than on the HASE. State-controlled companies listed on the HOSE have the lowest 
Effective Tax Rate (6.7%), and companies listed on the HOSE that are not state-controlled have 
the highest Effective Tax Rate (12.1%). 
The average logarithm of total assets (SIZE) of listed companies in Vietnam is 26.34, and the 
standard variance is 1.38. On both the HASE and the HOSE, state-controlled companies have 
larger SIZE than companies that are not state-controlled. 
The average fixed assets rate of listed companies in Vietnam is 30.2%, which is slightly lower 
than that of listed companies in China (34%) as reported by Guihai and Frank (2006). The 
standard variance is 21%. There is almost no difference between the fixed assets rate of listed 
companies on the HASE and on the HOSE, but the difference between state-controlled 
companies and companies that are not state-controlled is smaller on the HASE (31.1% vs. 29%) 
than on the HOSE (40.2% vs. 27.6%). 
The average Tobin’s Q of listed companies in Vietnam is 1.96, and the standard variance is 
1.30. Listed companies on the HOSE have a higher average Tobin’s Q than listed companies on 
the HASE (2.18 vs. 1.70). On the HOSE, state-controlled companies have a higher average 
Tobin’s Q than companies that are not state-controlled, but on the HASE the reverse is true: 
companies that are not state-controlled have a higher average Tobin’s Q than state-controlled 
companies.  
4. Estimation Results of Fundraising Behaviors of Listed Companies in Vietnam 
In order to investigate the differences in fundraising structure between companies on the Ho 
Chi Minh Securities Exchange (HOSE) and the Hanoi Securities Exchange (HASE) caused by 




   





           
         
 
 
   




   
 
       
         
         
         
           
     
 
         
   
                                                 
   
 
estimations for these two securities exchanges using the same estimation function. The 
estimation results are summarized in Tables 3-4 and 3-5.
12 
(Table 4-1) Estimation Results of Debt Ratios (HOSE) 
(Table 4-2) Estimation Results of Debt Ratios (HASE) 
In order to check the robustness of the state-controlled effect, we use the variable GOV (state 
holding ratio) instead of the dummy variable STATE. The estimation results are summarized in 
Tables 3-6 and 3-7. 
(Table 4-3) Estimation Results of Debt Ratios by Using the GOV Variable (HOSE) 
(Table 4-4) Estimation Results of Debt Ratios by Using the GOV Variable (HASE) 
We also conducted tests to check the significance of the differences between capital structures 
of listed companies on the two exchanges. 
(Table 4-5) Testing the Differences in Capital Structure of Listed Companies on the HOSE and 
the HASE 
There is no robustness between the estimation results using STATE and GOV. According to 
the estimation results, listed companies in Vietnam have the following characteristics. First, in 
general, the estimation results of the debt ratios are consistent with the corporate financing 
theory explained in Section 2: business scale (SIZE) and collateral ability (TANG) positively 
relate to the debt ratios, and growth opportunities (Q) negatively relates to the debt ratios. In the 
estimation of the Total Debt Ratio, Long-term Debt Ratio, and Long-term Bank Loan Ratio, we 
found no explanatory variables whose coefficients had signs that were contrary to the theoretical 
expectations and statistically significant. This suggests that standard corporate financing theories 
could be appropriate for explaining the capital structure of listed companies in Vietnam.  
12 According to the LM tests where the Pool OLS Model is the null hypothesis and the Random Effect Model 




                 
       
       
     
 
       
     
 
             
             
 
 
   
   
   
       
       
       
   
 
   
  
 
          
   
                                                 
     
 
Second, the capital structure of listed companies in Vietnam is better explained by the standard 
corporate financing theory based on the agency cost approach, in comparison with Nguyen 
(2006) and Biger et al. (2008). According to the agency cost approach, debt ratios have a positive 
relation with tangibility and a negative relation with firms’ growth opportunities. The results of 
our investigation support these hypotheses, while the findings of Nguyen (2006) and Biger et al. 
(2008) do not. 
Third, it seems that there are differences between the determinants of long-term fundraising 
and the determinants of short-term fundraising of listed companies in Vietnam. Firms’ scale 
(SIZE) and ability to provide collateral (TANG) have significantly positive relations with the 
Long-term Debt Ratio and the Long-term Bank Loan Ratio, while SIZE has no significant 
relation and TANG has a significantly negative relation with the Short-term Debt Ratio. This 
suggests that a firm’s ability to provide collateral is important for long-term borrowing decisions 
but not important for short-term borrowing decisions.  
Fourth, we found differences in the fundraising activities of state-controlled companies and 
companies that are not state-controlled. The fact that the cross terms STATE*TANG and 
GOV*TANG are significantly positive suggests that with the same amount of collateral, state-
controlled companies can borrow more than other companies. This means that state-controlled 
companies possess an advantage in reducing their agency costs that accompany the tapping of 
external borrowed funds.  
Fifth, the fundraising structure of the companies listed on the Ho Chi Minh Securities 
Exchange differs from the fundraising structure of the companies listed on the Hanoi Securities 
Exchange. The companies listed on the Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange were less dependent 
on borrowed funds than those listed on the Hanoi Securities Exchange, which suggests that there 
was a significant difference in the information asymmetry of companies listed on these two 
securities exchanges for outside creditors and outside investors.
13 
Lastly, listed companies in Vietnam have a weak incentive to reduce their tax payments 
through debt financing because the effective corporate tax rate is low. 
These observations suggest that the economic reform of Vietnam (“Doi Moi”), whose goal was 
market economization, has already achieved some successes in the corporate financing systems 
13 Recently, many companies have met the listing conditions of the HOSE but have remained listed on the 




     
         
       
 
 
               
         
 
           
   
         
   
   
     
       
     
           
   
 
     
   
         
       
 
        
   
 
   
 
   
for listed companies. However, in order to end the opaque collusion between state-controlled 
companies and banks and to protect outside creditors, further liberalization of the banking sector 
and disclosure of corporate information are urgently needed. 
5. Conclusion 
This study used data from 2006 to 2009 for listed companies on the Ho Chi Minh Securities 
Exchange and the Hanoi Securities Exchange that are representative of companies in Vietnam in 
order to investigate their fundraising determinants and investment behaviors. As was shown by 
the estimation results that were presented in the previous two sections, we arrived at many 
interesting findings. 
First, the capital structure of listed companies in Vietnam is consistent with standard 
corporation financing theories such as trade-off theory and agency cost theory. Compared to the 
capital structure of the companies facing an underdeveloped institutional environment analyzed 
by Nguyen (2006) and Biger et al. (2008), the capital structure of the listed companies could be 
better explained by agency cost theory. In addition, the debt ratios of the listed companies were 
higher than the debt ratios of the small-to-medium companies examined by Nguyen (2006). 
These observations suggest that the development of market infrastructure successfully mitigated 
the agency cost problem of listed companies that accompanies the tapping of external funds and, 
at the same time, made the listed companies’ capital structure more consistent with the 
theoretical prediction. 
Second, we found that state-controlled companies had higher debt ratios than other companies 
and that collateral assets are less important to state-controlled companies in borrowing. These 
results imply that state-controlled companies hold an advantageous position for reducing the 
agency costs attendant to tapping borrowed funds. This gives rise to the suspicion that state-
controlled listed companies have maintained the privilege to borrow easily from the state-
controlled banks even after being formally privatized and listed on the stock exchanges. 
Third, the companies listed on the Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange were less dependent on 
borrowed funds than those listed on the Hanoi Securities Exchange. Listing on the Ho Chi Minh 
Securities Exchange, whose listing conditions were more stringent than that of the Hanoi 
Securities Exchange, seemed to mitigate the information asymmetry problem between 





       
 
 
     
   
       
           
   
     
         


























suggests that the further information disclosure required by strengthening the regulations would 
encourage fund mobilization through stock markets and help companies diversify their sources 
of funds. 
This paper identified the key features of the fundraising structure and their effects on the 
investment behaviors of listed companies in Vietnam. In terms of fund mobilization and 
corporate financing, the economic reforms (“Doi Moi”) implemented by the Vietnamese 
government, which are aimed at creating an economic system based on market principles, have 
achieved some of their goals. However, our estimation study illustrates several limitations of the 
economic reforms, such as the opaque relationship between state-controlled companies and 
government banks, financial restrictions on investment activities, and the inactive investment of 
companies that are state-controlled or listed on the Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange. Solving 
these problems will require further investigation of the mechanisms behind the features identified 
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Table 1-1 Listing Conditions for the Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchanges 
Conditions  Hanoi Securities Exchange  Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange 
Minimum capital  10 billion VND  80 billion VND 
Business  Must have made a profit in the year  Must have made profits in two years 
performance  before listing (excluding privatized  before listing 
state-owned companies and newly 
established companies of the 
infrastructure industry and the high-
tech industry) 
Voting shares  Have to be possessed by at least 100  At least 20% of voting shares have to be 
shareholders  possessed by at least 100 shareholders. 
Source: Vietnam Securities Law 
Table 1-2 The Major Indices of Stock Exchanges  
Number of Listed 
Companies 







HASE HOSE HASE HOSE  HASE  HOSE Tril.  VND  %GDP 
2000 0 5 0 3  0  90  na  na 
2001 0  11 0  19  0  964  na  na 
2002   0  20  0  35  0  959  na  na 
2003 0  22 0  28  0  502  na  na 
2004 0  28 0  73  0  1,971  4  0.6 
2005 6  35  20  94  260  2,784  10  1.2 
2006 81  106 95  538  3,917  35,472  221  22.7 
2007 110 141 612  1,814  63,442  217,835  491  43.7 
2008 168 172  1,531  2,977  57,122  124,576  210  17.0 
2009  5,765  10,402  197,524  422,460  620  37.7 
Source: Homepages of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchanges 
Note: All are shown in year-end values. HASE means the Hanoi Securities Exchange, and HOSE means 






       
     
     
     
        






       
 
 
       
       
 
     
       
 
       





       
     
          
           
          
           
         
          
       
    










Table 3-1 Basic Statistics of the Main Variables 
TDR LDR  LBR  SDR  TAX  SIZE  TANG Q  GOV 
Mean  0.504  0.110 0.068 0.393 0.108 26.339  0.302 1.960 0.309 
Median  0.526  0.042 0.007 0.394 0.102 26.328  0.258 1.555 0.310 
Maximum  1.000  0.809 0.746 0.973 0.990 30.935  1.683 17.916  0.850 
Minimum  0.033  0.000 0.000 -0.618  0.000 22.844  0.003 0.970 0.000 
Std.  Dev. 0.224  0.151 0.120 0.207 0.089 1.3809  0.210 1.304 0.221
 Obs.   965   965  965  965   961  965   964  965  963 
Table 3-2 Comparison of State-controlled and Non-state-controlled Companies 
Hanoi Securities Exchange  Ho Chi Minh Securities 
Exchange 
State-owned  Non-state-owned  State-owned  Non-state-owned 
companies  companies  companies  companies 
Total Debt Ratio  0.602  0.551  0.442  0.440 
Long-term Debt Ratio  0.131  0.117  0.144  0.084 
Long-term Bank Loan 
Ratio 0.080  0.070  0.107  0.048 
Total assets  773  342  1,140  911 
Fixed assets ratio  0.311  0.290  0.402  0.276 
Effective Tax Rate  0.090  0.111  0.067  0.121 
Tobin’s Q  1.619  1.794  2.448  2.101 
Source: Homepages of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchanges
 
Note: Average values are from 2006 to 2009. Total assets are expressed in billion VND.
 
Table 3-3 Correlation Coefficients of the Explanatory Variables 
Correlation  TDR  LDR  LBR  SDR  TAX  SIZE  TANG  PROF  Q 
TDR  1.000000 
LDR  0.445216  1.000000 
LBR  0.354455  0.771938  1.000000 
SDR  0.757496 -0.247319 -0.179254  1.000000 
TAX  -0.213798 -0.167162 -0.156914 -0.109474  1.000000 
SIZE  0.233696  0.334281  0.283929  0.009162 -0.110046  1.000000 
TANG  0.034261  0.566854  0.566769 -0.376212 -0.153392  0.066062  1.000000 
PROF  -0.529193 -0.295935 -0.253799 -0.356876  0.249214 -0.200630 -0.079640  1.000000 






   
    
       
         
       
   
       
         
         
     
     
         
         
       
       
    
       
         
         
         
         
         
         
       
         
    
   
       
   
   
 
   


















Table 4-1 Estimation Results of Debt Ratios (HOSE) 
Variable Coefficient  Prob.  Coefficient  Prob.  Coefficient  Prob.  Coefficient  Prob. 
C -0.120  -0.668*  -0.312**  0.542** 
TAX(-1) 0.021  -0.007  -0.020  0.029 
SIZE(-1) 0.022**  0.026*  0.012** -0.003 
TANG(-1) 0.018  0.138*** 0.125***  -0.114** 
Q(-1) -0.021***  -0.005***  -0.004  -0.015*** 
STATE*TAX 0.019  0.368*  0.188  -0.343 
STATE*SIZE -0.001  -0.006***  -0.005***  0.005*** 
STATE*TANG 0.289***  0.440***  0.446***  -0.153 
STATE*Q -0.016***  -0.000  0.000  -0.016*** 
Y2008 -0.025*  -0.007  -0.001  -0.017 
Y2009 -0.035**  -0.018**  -0.001  -0.017 
CONS 0.105*  0.072**  0.037  0.033 
MANU -0.018  0.000  -0.007  -0.019 
MIN -0.046  0.011  -0.012  -0.058 
POWE -0.055  0.074  -0.150***  -0.131 
SERV 0.041  0.054  -0.033  -0.014 
CARR -0.029  0.091** 0.076**  -0.122 
COM 0.194  0.100  -0.001  0.093 
REAL 0.161*  0.120**  0.021  0.042 
COMM -0.013  -0.007  -0.022  -0.005 
Adjusted R-squared  0.101  0.334  0.365  0.071 
S.E. of regression  0.088  0.052  0.049  0.080 
F-statistic 3.131  0.000  10.454  0.000  11.835  0.000  2.452  0.000 
Observations 359  359  359  359 
Hausman test 
X
2(10) 50.896  0.000  41.946  0.000  34.483  0.000  50.741 






   
 
 
    
   
   
 
   
   
      
   
 
 
    
   
   
    
 
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
    
   
     




















Table 4-2 Estimation Results of Debt Ratios (HASE) 
Variable Coefficient  Prob.  Coefficient  Prob.  Coefficient  Prob.  Coefficient  Prob. 
C -0.629  0.028  -0.750  0.001  -0.592  0.000  0.161  0.573 
TAX(-1) -0.050  0.673  0.136  0.112  0.020  0.795  -0.203  0.075 
SIZE(-1) 0.050  0.000  0.035  0.000 0.024  0.000 0.013  0.180 
TANG(-1) 0.038  0.406  0.097  0.003  0.136  0.000  -0.072  0.104 
Q(-1) -0.017  0.045  -0.012  0.042  -0.008  0.149  -0.000  0.927 
STATE*TAX -0.101  0.557  -0.005  0.964  -0.113  0.328  -0.073  0.658 
STATE*SIZE 0.008  ***  -0.002  0.077  -0.000  0.490 0.010  *** 
STATE*TANG -0.324  ***  0.161  ***  0.141  ***  -0.482  *** 
STATE*Q -0.047  ***  -0.002  0.873 -0.014  0.233 -0.042  *** 
Y2008 -0.046  0.010  -0.009  0.460  -0.004  0.699  -0.038  0.023 
Y2009 -0.038  0.048  -0.014  0.294  -0.017  0.174  -0.022  0.228 
CONS -0.002  0.982  -0.037  0.682 0.042  0.545 0.031  0.788
 
MANU -0.143  0.217  -0.076  0.405  0.011  0.872  -0.072  0.534
 
MIN -0.016  0.899  0.043  0.675  0.075  0.340 -0.062  0.635
 
POWE -0.108  0.437  0.062  0.576  0.049  0.557  -0.173  0.220
 
SERV -0.137  0.266  -0.054  0.577  0.047  0.527  -0.091  0.461
 
CARR -0.094  0.464  -0.034  0.734  0.078  0.310  -0.064  0.618
 
COM -0.004  0.975  -0.169  0.182  -0.014  0.879  0.162  0.311 
REAL -0.087  0.645  -0.135  0.374  0.034  0.759  0.036  0.850 
COMM -0.120  0.511  0.009  0.947  0.099  0.357  -0.134  0.470 
Adjusted R-squared  0.243  0.175  0.202  0.226 
S.E. of regression  0.092  0.066  0.065  0.088 
F-statistic 6.089  0.000  4.372  0.000  5.016  0.000  5.640  0.000 
Observations 302 302 302 302 
Hausman test X
2(10) 50.210  0.000  35.105  0.000 41.079  0.000 32.830  0.000 







   
 
 
    
   









    
 
 





   
 
   
   
 
    
   
     



















Table 4-3 Estimation Results of Debt Ratios by using GOV (HOSE) 
Variable Coefficient  Prob.  Coefficient  Prob. Coefficient  Prob. Coefficient  Prob. 
C -0.188  0.5193  -0.718  0.0000  -0.392  0.0049  0.521  0.0534 
TAX(-1) 0.029  0.7320  -0.011  0.8291  -0.018  0.6832  0.034  0.6674 
SIZE(-1) 0.025  0.0193  0.029  0.0000  0.016  0.0017 -0.003  0.7502 
TANG(-1) -0.003  0.9524  0.099  0.0053  0.078  0.0117 -0.101  0.0666 
Q(-1) -0.022  0.0000  -0.008  0.0033 -0.007  0.0047 -0.014  0.0017 
GOV*TAX -0.352  0.2352  0.206  0.2499  0.083  0.6034 -0.581  0.0369 
GOV*SIZE 0.002  0.4775  -0.005  0.0134  -0.004  0.0406 0.008  0.0198 
GOV*TANG 0.392  0.0280  0.681  0.0000  0.720  0.0000 -0.284  0.0867 
GOV*Q -0.050  0.0000  -0.013  0.0476 -0.009  0.1425 -0.038  0.0004 
Y2008 -0.040  0.0036  -0.016  0.0531 -0.010  0.1837 -0.023  0.0648 
Y2009 -0.052  0.0009  -0.027  0.0037 -0.010  0.2384 -0.025  0.0884 
CONS 0.102  0.1007  0.061  0.0874 0.023  0.4005 0.041  0.4698 
MANU -0.023  0.6731  -0.009  0.7626 -0.023  0.3628 -0.012  0.8059 
MIN -0.020  0.8406  0.021  0.7069  -0.006  0.8787 -0.038  0.6717 
POWE -0.043  0.6200  0.075  0.1398 -0.146  0.0004 -0.120  0.1373 
SERV 0.062  0.4770  0.049  0.3263  -0.040  0.3082  0.013  0.8707 
CARR -0.020  0.7628  0.083  0.0333  0.066  0.0330 -0.103  0.0949 
COM 0.197  0.1417  0.103  0.1823  1.46E-05  0.9998  0.093  0.4429 
REAL 0.157  0.0614  0.110  0.0231  0.012  0.7414  0.047  0.5349 
COMM -0.017  0.8025  -0.015  0.7075 -0.033  0.2926 -0.001  0.9875 
Adjusted R-squared  0.123  0.341  0.393  0.090 
S.E. of regression  0.086  0.052  0.049  0.080 
F-statistic 3.644  0.000  10.789  0.000  13.225  0.000  2.866  0.000 
Observations 359  359  359  359 
Hausman test X
2(10) 45.155  0.000  35.386  0.000 44.432  0.000 40.780  0.000 






   
 
          
      
     
     
   
   
   
      
   
   
   
   
      
    
    
      
   
   
   
    
    
   
   
    
     
      
     
       
     
 
   
      
 


















Table 4-4 Estimation Results of Debt Ratios by using GOV (HASE) 





















































































































































































Adjusted R-squared  0.238  0.210  0.260  0.249 
S.E. of regression  0.090  0.064  0.063  0.086 
F-statistic 5.956  0.000  5.234  0.000  6.592  0.000  6.259  0.000 
Observations 302  302  302  302 
Hausman test X
2(10) 43.528  0.000 22.089  0.014 26.592  0.003 33.215  0.000 
Notes: ***，**，and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
(Table 4-5) Testing the Differences in the Capital Structures of the HOSE and the HASE
 HOSE HASE  Test of the difference 
(P value) 
TDR 0.441  0.576  0.000 
LDR 0.098  0.124  0.008 
LBR 0.062  0.471  0.089 
SDR 0.342  0.452  0.000 
TAX 0.109  0.101  0.098 
SIZE 26.719  25.906  0.000 
TANG 0.304  1.619  0.773 
Q 2.180  1.707  0.000 
Sample 515  449 










   
 
   
       
 
 
   
  
   
     
 
   
 
    
 




   
 
 




   
    
     
   
 
         
 
   
 
         
     
 
   
   
   
 
 
    





Table A-1 Privatization of State-owned Companies in Vietnam 
Regulation on equitization of state-owned companies (7/5/1996) 
Object companies: State-owned companies that satisfy 3 conditions: (1) They are small-medium 
companies, (2) There is no need for the state to hold 100% ownership, (3) There is an efficient 
investment plan. 
Regulation on equitization of state-owned companies (revised 29/6/1998) 
Object companies: State-owned companies for which there is no need for the state to hold 100% ownership 
Regulation on equitization of foreign-owned companies (15/4/2003) 
Object companies: Foreign-owned companies that have been running at least 3 years and made a profit in 
the year before applying for equitization. 
Simultaneity of equitizing and listing of state-owned companies (revised 4/8/2005) 
State-owned companies that satisfy the listing conditions of the Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange or the 
Hanoi Securities Exchange can equitize and list at the same time. 
Regulation on issuing company bonds （19/5/2006） 
Object companies: joint-stock companies, state-owned companies that have become joint-stock companies 
or limited liability companies, foreign-owned companies. 
Regulation on equitization of state-owned companies (revised 26/6/2007) 
Source: Compiled by the authors from various sources. 
Table A-2 Banking Reform and Liberalization of Interest Rates in Vietnam 
Period 
Before 1988  Monobank system: There is no separation of the functions of financial institutions. 
Regulation of the interest rate is independent of foreign interest rates. The nominal 
interest rate is lower than the inflation rate; thus, the real interest rate is negative.  
26/3/1988  Separation of the functions of the state bank and commercial banks  
According to 53/HDBT Order 
1989–5/1992  Fixed interest rate regime 
The interest rate is adjusted in relation to the fluctuation of the price index. 
Interest rates of foreign currencies are those of the world market. 
6/1992–1995  Limited interest rate regime 
The State Bank of Vietnam fixes the lower limit of the deposit interest rate and the 
ceiling of the lending interest rate. Commercial banks decide their interest rates based 
on those interest rates. 
1996–7/2000 Ceiling  interest  rate  regime 
The deposit interest rate is liberated, and the ceiling of the lending interest rate is fixed. 
8/2000–5/2002  Basic interest rate and flexible interest rate regime 
The basic interest rate and the allowed movement rate are announced monthly. In case 
of necessity, the state bank will announce proper adjustments. Commercial banks 
negotiate with borrowers and decide lending interest rates based on these rates. 
5/2001–Present Liberalization  of  interest rates of foreign currencies 

Interest rates of foreign currencies are decided on the basis of their interest rates on 

world markets and their demand and supply in the domestic market.  

6/2002–Present  Expansion of liberalization of the deposit interest rate and the lending interest rate 
Liberalizing the deposit interest rate and the lending interest rate of VND  
Setting a ceiling for the deposit interest rate of USD of companies, but liberating the 
deposit interest rate of USD of individuals  






      
 
   
     
   
   
     
     
   





   
     
    
 
 


















Table A-3 Corporate Tax on Listed Companies in Vietnam 
Corporate Tax Law (17/6/2003） 
(1) Tax rate: 28% 
(2) Preference tax rate: (1) Applying a tax rate of 20%, 15%, or 10% for companies that are newly 
established in preference industries or preference areas, (2) Applying a tax exemption (at most 
4 years) and half reduction (at most next 9 years) for the companies that are moved to 
preference areas, (3) Applying a tax exemption (at most 4 years) and half reduction (at most 
next 7 years) for the increasing profit of the companies that apply new production lines or 
new technology.  
Regulation of tax preferences for listed companies (20/10/2004) 
(1) Applying a tax exemption in 2 years after listing for newly listed companies, (2) If listing is not 
at the beginning of the year, the tax exemption could be calculated from the next year, (3) If 
Preferences of Corporate Tax Law are being applied, this preference could be applied after 
applying those preferences. 
Nullification of regulation on tax preferences for listed companies (8/9/2006) 
(1) For the companies listing after 1/1/2007, preferences of the above regulation are not applied, 
(2) For the companies listing before 1/1/2007, preferences of the above regulation are applied. 
Source: Homepages of the Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange and the Hanoi Securities Exchange. 
Table A-4 Breakdown of Listed Companies by Industry 
Hanoi Securities  Ho Chi Minh Securities  Total 
Exchange  Exchange 
Number of  Proportion  Number of  Proportio  Number of  Proportion 
companies  (%)  companies  n (%)  companies  (%) 
Agriculture, forestry,  4 2.38  15  8.77  19 5.60 
and fisheries 
Construction 67  39.88  27  15.79  94  27.73 
Manufacturing 54  32.14  68  39.77  122  35.99 
Mining 8  4.76  4  2.34  12  3.54 
Power 4  2.38  5  2.92  9  2.65 
Service 11  6.55  7  4.09  18  5.31 
Carrier 8  4.76  19  11.11  27  7.96 
Finance 6  3.57  4  2.34  10  2.95 
Communication 3  1.79  2  1.17  5  1.47 
Real estate  1  0.60  6  3.51  7  2.06 
Commerce 2  1.19  14  8.19  16  4.72 
Total 168  100  172  100  340 100 
Source: Homepages of the Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchanges 
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